Posted on Sep 30th, 2008
by
Donan
As you well know, our economy is in serious trouble. I just dropped the following off to my congressman's office along with a personal note; if you agree with me, please send this to your representative or direct your congressman or senator here-make sure you put your contact info on it in case your representative wants to speak with you about your opinion (it happens) :
Dear Congressman/Senator...
Agreeing that something must be done, i suggest that the bailout most beneficial to all Americans and to our economy would be a bailout for troubled homeowners rather than a blind bailout for financial institutions. This will stabilize the markets faster than the proposed $700 billion blank check. Rarely has government ever used funds wisely, particularly when there is no definite plan for usage--we should not expect that to change when times are dire. We need to institute a real solution. I believe we can, but only with your help and the strong leadership we sought when you were elected.
This first notion will be nothing new to you, but it strikes me as tragic that the plan passed a few months ago, The HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008*, which, with $300 billion in funding, encouraged banks to mitigate their exposure in difficult mortgage instruments with minimal write-down has not been adopted by the very financial institutions now requiring bailout.
The market for Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) is dead because no one actually knows what is inside some of those MBS's and no institution wants to buy a 21st century junk bond...In a moral failure, institutions would rather have the government buy the MBS's blindly than reveal what they actually are and write down the losses...it is lower corporate risk for the boards to hold out for a free-ticket bailout without actually figuring out what is inside these devalued securities. The MBS market will not turn until the MBS model has been purged of its inflated valuations.
The rules and rationale which a lender's Loss Mitigation Departments use are designed to try and keep as much as possible for the banks and thereby prop up MBS values--this is shortsighted and self-defeating. Institutions must look at the packages they have securitized and determine which loans in the package are in difficulty. Those loans should be cleaned and written down as dictated by a modified, mandatory version of the FHA backed HOPE plan. This will impact stock prices, no doubt, and it will not be as instant as a blind governmental buyout, but it will be much fairer to the taxpayer and it will restore liquidity to the market while telling business that government will not reward poor practice.
A swift law which forces the immediate reevaluation of notes prior to foreclosure, within the confines of that plan (or expanded as I will explain below), rather than leaving the write-downs an option to the institutions, in order that/before they might obtain any favorable governmental purchase of those instruments, should be written. With this law in place these same instruments, which have low value due to increased risk, can be made less risky by repackaging, even if the write-downs are roughly 30% of value.
Rationale: If 10 to 20% of all mortgages are in trouble and those mortgages are 30% over home value by today's market standards, a 12 trillion homes market size at 15% in foreclosure or danger of the same is $1.8 trillion. If the average property value has declined 30%, that decline amounts to $360 billion or roughly half what is being requested for the bailout.
If we recognize that there are many homes in the nation whose owners are in trouble but who have thus far managed to remain current we could potentially increase the jeopardy to the $700 billion mark. This should amount to a total bailout of the banking system.
[Aside: The U.S. stock market still has roughly the same absolute value it had a month ago when it was trading substantially up from where it is today. The price, or perceived value, has markedly shifted. This is a temporary thing and like all markets, will correct appropriately once the current panic has subsided. We must recognize that the goal of any plan should not be to preserve market value for the financial institutions or, regrettably, even the retirement incomes of those who have seen such amazing returns for the last 15 years--throughout most of this bubble--now eroded. Record reported profits on buried risk has inflated institutional stock prices and brought excessively large bonuses to individuals who were unscrupulous in their efforts: this activity must not be rewarded--the boards and even the unfortunate stockholders of these institutions should not have their portfolios buoyed at the expense of our children's future spending potential (higher taxes=less disposable income).]
Now, if we take the above troubled institutions and force them to utilize their loss mitigation departments to swiftly restructure securitized debt according to the 90% market appraisal plan guaranteed FHA offer we find that the bailout is accomplished at an overall lower cost to taxpayers, mind you, without the happy swift “here's a bunch of cash for your bad loans” for which the boards have been holding out, BUT it solves several major problems...
1) The continued and rapid erosion of the housing market due to increased short sales and foreclosure sales is abbreviated.
2) Liquidity of troubled financial institutions is bolstered with the FHA guaranteed loans and the assurance of promised cash into the system. Forcing the institutions which hold notes to clean up their portfolio packages will create a real market for government-backed securities. Cleaned securities will have proper valuation with known risks. This does not preserve institutional profits but it does preserve the institutions themselves--their perceived value will bounce back as they return to profitability via sound fiscal policies. A side benefit is that without a semi-"free ticket" bailout, such future activities will be highly curtailed by the institutions themselves whether or not legislation such as Greenspan has suggested since the early 90's forces policies which minimize risk and conserve depositor's trust (FHFA will do much good here as well).
3) Troubled homeowners are bailed out rather than the institutions which gave them risky loans. This seems perhaps still a bit unfair to the average taxpayer who is not losing their home, but with another depressed value home kept off of the market when it would have been rendered vacant with foreclosure, Item No. 1 comes into play and benefits all homeowners with increased market valuation (as opposed with another below market sale). This creates a self-mitigating bailout which not only benefits troubled mortgagees but the owners of all homes as the market recovers.
4) By repackaging the loans via a modified HOPE plan, the value of mortgages will actually increase because a large part of the value of the loan is the risk factor calculated as a function of the likelihood of default. Making an unaffordable mortgage affordable reduces the note’s inherent risk of default to a traditionally low level thereby decreasing the risk multiplier for the security.
5) The profit share for the FHA in the existing plan greatly minimizes the people's risk of loss.
6) Public fear that the banking system will collapse can be alleviated by the clear statement of a plausible government-backed, government-mandated solution which preserves the institutions’ stability/liquidity while reducing long term risks to the taxpayers. Add the opinion of someone with credibility such as Greenspan, should he agree with this, and the fear and uncertainty in the market could be somewhat allayed as well.
7) Expansion of the existing plan to include secondary residences will further cut market loss and though it would seemingly add a level of unfairness as perception is that only the wealthy own second homes, it should be realized that a second home is not necessarily an indication of wealth and often is not.
Why should the plan be expanded?
Real-World Example No. 1: A couple who have been transferred to another city. She is a state director for a non-profit agency. He works for Unum and has been allowed to continue his employment in Ohio where they rent while they wait to sell their existing home. Their vacant home has been on the market for 8 months. They are making payments on their vacant house, are never late, and are finding themselves deeper and deeper in debt. The for sale sign notes that the house is also for lease. They cannot sell the house for less than the listed price because they simply do not have the money to pay the bank if they sell it for less than what is owed--the market absolutely won't support this and if something does not happen soon, the house could go into foreclosure and the bank will take a loss and this good family’s credit will be ruined.
Real-World Example No. 2: A single mother who works as a secretary. She has exceptional credit. No late payments ever on her mortgage...an identical house across the street just sold short for $35,000 less than what she owes. In the divorce trial earlier this year ending her 20 year marriage, she asked the judge not to award her the marital residence. The judge awarded her the house anyway and left her a budget shortfall of more than $500 a month. She has cut her expenses massively, selling her newer car and purchasing an older car which gets lower mileage, and making any other budget cut she can muster. Even with this, she still must put $200-300 every month on a credit card which is quickly filling up—additionally, the father of the children is in arrears on child support and alimony. To date she has never been late on a payment--consequently the bank will not talk to her. Proactively mitigating the chance that her children would be homeless, this single mother purchased a smaller house which needed considerable repair knowing that she would soon lose her existing home if she did not rent it for at least her payment. Downsizing and renting out the family home seemed the only way to save her credit and keep a roof over head. With the initial leasing plans fallen through she has had an offer to rent for $200 less per month than the interest-only loan payment and cannot make up the difference. A realtor friend is trying to help but the house has not yet rented.
Neither of these situations is solved with the existing plan, nor is the problem of true second homes owned by middle class people who placed their retirement funds into real estate. Admittedly those retirement funds were paid to the tier up the pyramid who actually sold before pricing plummeted, but those homes do not necessarily need to go on the market, and those people could have the opportunity to recover half of their retirement nest-egg when the market recovers. If they lose the homes, the markets will continue to erode and the almost bankrupt Social Security system will be their only social safety net.
Please take these ideas into serious consideration as you work on the Economic Recovery Package currently in Congress. To keep struggling homeowners off the streets and to save the United States taxpayers’ hard earned dollars, I ask that you weigh in directly with the above suggestions and demand that the best workable solution is attained. A strict “bailout” is a short term, short-sighted answer, but a true Economic Recovery Solution will protect the American people and bolster the economy. Please speak out as my representative to forge a working solution for working Americans everywhere.
Sincerely Yours,
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